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A B S T R A C T
The case of the ‘murder of Meredith Kercher’ has been the subject of intense media scrutiny since
2007 when the offence was committed. Three individuals were arrested and accused of the crime.
Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito were exonerated in March 2015. Another defendant, Rudy Guede,
remains convicted as the sole perpetrator. He was implicated by multiple DNA proﬁles recovered from
the murder room and the bathroom. However, the evidence against Guede contrasted strongly with the
limited evidence against two co-defendants, Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito. There were no DNA
proﬁles pertaining to Amanda Knox in the murder room itself. She was separately implicated by a knife
recovered remote from the crime scene (discovered in a cutlery drawer at Sollecito’s apartment), along
with DNA proﬁles in a bathroom that she had shared with the victim. Upon analysis a low level trace of
DNA attributed to the murder victim was found on the blade of a knife, along with DNA proﬁles attributed
to Amanda Knox from the handle. However, there was no evidence of blood on the knife blade itself. A
separate key piece of evidence was a DNA proﬁle attributed to Raffaele Sollecito recovered from a forcibly
removed bra-clasp found in the murder room. There followed an extraordinary series of trials and retrials
where the pair were convicted, exonerated, re-convicted and ﬁnally, in March 2015 they were ﬁnally
exonerated (no further appeal is possible). Since Knox and Sollecito have been found innocent it is
opportune to carry out an extensive review of the case to discover the errors that led to conviction so that
similar mistakes do not occur in the future. It is accepted that the DNA proﬁles attributed to them were
transferred by methods unrelated to the crime event itself. There is a wealth of material available from
the judgements and other reports which can be analysed in order to show the errors of thinking. The ﬁnal
judgement of the case–the Marasca-Bruno motivation report–exposes the illogicality of much of the
previous court proceedings that led to the convictions and provides useful guidance for judges to follow.
ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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The controversial case of ‘Death of Meredith Kercher’ was
discussed in Rome on April 27th–28th, 2012, at an international
conference organized by Vince Pascali. The meeting was entitled
‘The hidden side of DNA proﬁles’[1]. At the time of the meeting,
Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito had already been convicted at
trial, and subsequently exonerated at appeal. It had appeared to the
group assembled in Rome that a miscarriage of justice had already
occurred and it was discussed as such. Surprisingly, the judgment
was set aside a year later by the ‘Supreme Court of Cassation’ and a
retrial was ordered. Knox and Sollecito were convicted again at
another hearing presided over by Judge Nencini. It wasn’t until the
ﬁnal appeal (the Marasca-Bruno motivation) was heard in 2015,E-mail addresses: peterd.gill@gmail.com, peterd.gill@virgin.net (P. Gill).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2016.02.015
1872-4973/ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access a
nd/4.0/).that the pair were exonerated and a miscarriage of justice (with
certainty of binding ﬁnality) was ofﬁcially conﬁrmed.
Miscarriages of justice represent a failure of the criminal justice
system. When they occur, they deserve full attention and analysis
in order to establish ‘what went wrong’. It is of little use to simply
consign such events to history, dismissed as a ‘one-off’ event, since
history does tend to repeat itself. A period of reﬂection should
follow at all levels of the criminal justice system in order to answer
questions such as:
1. Can we identify the ﬂawed practice that led to the wrongful
convictions?
2. What can be done to prevent reoccurrence in the future?
3. How can the interaction of scientists, investigators and judges
be improved?
4. Are there any other cases, already prosecuted, that are similarly
affected.rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
10 P. Gill / Forensic Science International: Genetics 23 (2016) 9–18It is likely that for every miscarriage that has been identiﬁed,
there are many that are never discovered because errors tend to be
serially repeated across different cases [2]. Once a ﬂawed method
has been established as ‘normal practice’, practitioners perceive
their reports to be scientiﬁcally acceptable and court-acceptance
unwittingly raises the credibility to become an established practice
via a positive feedback loop. This strengthens the practitioners’
conﬁdence, further reinforcement continues via peer review and
training i.e. the failure is manifest (and self-perpetuated) at all
levels of the criminal justice system. The consequences can be
devastating. A recent example was exposed in relation to hair
analysis conducted by FBI laboratories[3] where: “Twenty-six of
28 FBI agent/analysts provided either testimony with erroneous
statements or submitted laboratory reports with erroneous state-
ments.” And this has resulted in numerous1 wrongful convictions
in the USA.
The case discussed here relates to the proven miscarriage of
justice of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito in relation to the
accusation of murder of Meredith Kercher in Perugia, Italy on the
1st November, 20072. Another defendant, Rudy Guede, was
separately tried and found guilty of her murder in October
2008. In contrast with Knox and Sollecito, the evidence against
Guede was overwhelming. His DNA was found at numerous sites at
the crime-scene, including the victim’s vaginal swab, and her
clothing. Furthermore, he had no legitimate access to the premises.
However, he later implicated Knox and Sollecito after initially
denying their involvement in the crime.
Knox and Sollecito were tried in January 2009 before Judge
Giancarlo Massei. They were found guilty and sentenced to
26 years and 25 years imprisonment, respectively. Under Italian
law convicted defendants are guaranteed a retrial and this began in
November 2010 before Judges Hellmann and Zanetti. In October
2011, these judges acquitted Knox and Sollecito, accepting defence
arguments on the lack of evidence and contamination. Both
defendants were released. There followed a successful appeal from
the prosecution (the Galati-Costagliola appeal) and in March 2013,
the ‘Supreme Court of Cassation,’ presided over by Dr Severo
Chiefﬁ, set aside the judgment of the appellate court and ordered a
retrial at the appeal level. In January 2014, an appellate court panel
led by Judge Alessandro Nencini found the pair guilty (again),
overturning the previous Hellmann-Zanetti judgement. Finally the
pair were acquitted by the Marasca-Bruno motivation report and
this ended the judicial process under Italian law.
This paper is necessarily restricted to the interpretation of the
DNA evidence—without it the original convictions probably would
not have occurred. Independent analyses of the data have been
undertaken by Gill [2] and Balding et al. [4]. Given the proven
innocence of Knox/Sollecito we are confronted with multiple
instances of the CSI effect, where prosecutors, scientists and
judges, allow speculation to override logical thought processes.
Unfortunately this is characteristic of miscarriages of justice (as an
analogy see the excellent report of Vincent [5] relating to the
miscarriage of justice of Farah Jama resulting from a contamination
incident).
1.1. Hierarchy of propositions
It is well established that the preferred method to evaluate
evidence begins with an understanding of the ‘hierarchy of
propositions framework’ e.g. [6,7]. The lowest level of the1 Seventy four out of 329 wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence
involved faulty hair analysis.
2 Although the time of death was never conclusively established, most sources
pinpoint late evening of November 1st.framework is the ‘sub-source’ level where the strength of evidence
of the DNA proﬁle is either described by a probability or a verbal
statement. For low template LT-DNA proﬁles, it is often not
possible to associate the DNA proﬁle with a given body ﬂuid such
as blood or semen. This level of interpretation (e.g. the DNA came
from blood) is described as the ‘source-level’. However, courts are
primarily interested in the ‘activity-level’ i.e. the method by which
the DNA was transferred to the evidence. Mistakes arise if there is
an attempt to directly associate the probability of the DNA proﬁle
(sub-source) with the ‘activity’, such as stabbing a victim. The
statistics cannot be transposed in this way [8], yet this error of logic
is often made. To evaluate evidence at the ‘activity-level’ requires a
detailed understanding of transfer and persistence of DNA [9–12],
as well as an understanding of the risks of potential contamination
[13–19]. When such data are available, using the likelihood ratio
method, the strength of evidence at the activity level is usually very
much lower in comparison with the sub-source DNA proﬁle [20],
reﬂecting the inherent uncertainties.
1.2. Confusion of the ’identity’ of the DNA proﬁle with the ’activity’ of
its transfer
Gill [2] recently proposed a revised deﬁnition of the term ”Trace
DNA” that does not require LT-DNA as an anchor. Trace DNA is
deﬁned as any sample where there is uncertainty that it may be
associated with the crime event itself—so that it is possible that the
transfer may have occurred before the crime event (innocent
transfer) or after the crime event (investigator mediated).
To avoid confusion of the ’identity’ of the proﬁle and the
’activity’ whereby the DNA proﬁle was transferred (to become
evidence), it is necessary to consider two separate questions:
 Does the evidence support a ’match’ with the defendant?
 How was the evidence propagated?
The analysis of the DNA proﬁle only answers the ﬁrst question,
and cannot be used to adduce the strength of evidence that relates
to the second part. In relation to the latter, a consideration of
possible alternative modes of DNA transfer is as follows:
 Primary transfer (direct contact with an object or person).
 Secondary transfer (indirect or ’innocent contact’, that is not
related to the crime itself).
 Laboratory contamination.
In this case Sollecito, Knox and Kercher all lived in close
proximity, hence it was not surprising to ﬁnd their DNA proﬁles at
the crime-scene, forming part of the pre-existing background.
Consequently, the ‘identity’ of the DNA proﬁles was always a
secondary consideration to the modus operandi of transfer
possibilities listed above.
2. List of the judgements and access to the key documents
(English translations)
The key reports are listed chronologically:
December 2009 (published March 2010): The Massei sentencing
report [21] (the judges reasoning for the original conviction).
June 2011: Conti-Vecchiotti Report [22] (a report by the defence
experts appointed by the Hellmann-Zanetti court).
October 2011 (published December 2011): The Hellmann-Zanetti
motivation report [23] (the judges reasoning for the acquittal of
Knox and Sollecito).
February 2012: The Galati-Costagliola appeal [24] (the prosecu-
tion argument against the acquittal).
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Cassation motivation report [25] (judges overturn the acquittal
and a retrial is ordered).
January 2014 (published April 2014): The Nencini motivation
report [26] (The conviction is upheld and the Hellmann report is
rejected).
March 2015 (published September 2015): Marasca-Bruno moti-
vation report v1.2 [27]. Acquittal of Amanda Knox and Raffaele
Sollecito. The report highlights failures at all levels of the criminal
justice system.
3. An outline of the case-circumstances
The victim, Meredith Kercher shared an upper-ﬂoor ﬂat with
Amanda Knox (their rooms were adjacent) and two Italian women
in their late twenties. Four young men rented the ﬂat below.
Raffaele Sollecito was the boyfriend of Amanda Knox—she had
started a relationship with him one week earlier.
The version of events put forward by the defence (now accepted
as true) are as follows: on the morning of the 2th November, Knox
returned home from Sollecito’s apartment to shower and to change
clothes. In the bathroom were small spots of blood in the sink;
Kercher’s bedroom door was locked. Knox returned to Sollecito’s
apartment to ask him to ‘check things out’ as she was naturally
concerned. Sollecito unsuccessfully attempted to force entry into
Meredith’s bedroom (grasping the outer-door-handles). The police
were called, and eventually the door into Meredith’s bedroom was
forced open3 and Meredith’s body was discovered. She had been
brutally stabbed in the neck and torso and had died from blood loss
and asphyxiation. The cottage became a crime-scene. Rudy Guede
was (and remains) convicted of the murder of Kercher by
overwhelming evidence4 However, he was relevant to the
prosecution case against Knox and Sollecito since, after initially
denying their involvement, he alleged that he had acted together
with them. The ‘trace-DNA’ evidence that was used in the trial of
Amanda Knox and Rafaelle Sollecito formed a major part of the
evidence against them. However, there was no plausible motive5
for the attack.
A murder weapon had not been discovered at or near the crime
scene, therefore the weapon must have been removed. A large
knife (item 36) was later retrieved remote from the crime-scene in
a cutlery drawer in Sollecito’s apartment. The investigators alleged
this to be the murder weapon. The defence said that it was not the
murder weapon. The knife was tested for DNA and a proﬁle
matching Amanda Knox was found on the handle and a low-level
proﬁle matching Meredith Kercher was found on the blade. The
prosecution alleged that the DNA was transferred to the handle
when Knox stabbed Kercher with the knife—the DNA from Kercher
was consequently transferred to the blade as a direct result of her
bleeding from the wounds inﬂicted.3 Some of the ﬂatmates kicked in the door while police were present.
4 Extract from the Massei report: “The hand-print found on a pillow in the room,
on which the lifeless corpse of Meredith was found placed, turned out to have been
made by Rudy Guede; the vaginal swab of the victim contained the DNA of the
victim and of Rudy Guede (author’s note: no sperm found); the DNA of Rudy Guede
was also found on the cuff of Meredith’s sweatshirt found in her room, and on a
strap of the bra that she was wearing, found cut off and stained with blood; the DNA
of Rudy Guede was also found on Meredith’s purse, which was also in the room that
she occupied. Further biological traces of Rudy Guede were found on the toilet
paper taken from the toilet of the larger bathroom.”
5 Prosecutors put forward an implausible motive of a sex-game ‘gone wrong’.4. The evidence
4.1. The kitchen knife—collection and examination
The knife was collected from Sollecito’s apartment on Novem-
ber 6, 2007. Ofﬁcers testiﬁed that they wore ordinary clothes, but
put on gloves and footwear before entering the unit. The knife was
found in a kitchen drawer with other cutlery. It is not clear who
handled the knife at the apartment, or whether the ofﬁcers
changed gloves between the handling of different pieces of
evidence. Ofﬁcers testiﬁed that the knife was put in an envelope,
which had been used to store new gloves for the ofﬁcers, for
transfer to the police station. One ofﬁcer who handled the knife at
police headquarters had been in Kercher’s apartment, and
speciﬁcally in Knox’s room, earlier in the day. Police ofﬁcers did
not remove other knives or test them to control for background
contamination.
According to the report authored by the independent experts,
Professors Carla Vecchiotti and Stefano Conti, one ofﬁcer testiﬁed
that, at the police station, he had noticed that the knife packaging
was not properly sealed and that he closed two gaps in the
envelope with tape. Another ofﬁcer testiﬁed that, wearing gloves,
he later removed the knife from the envelope and put it in a non-
sterile box that he closed with tape.
The knife was transferred to the laboratory, where the item was
examined. The laboratory reports showed that seven samples were
taken from the knife (sample 36): four from the blade (samples B,
C, E, and G) and three from the handle (A, D, and F). The knife was
tested as one item in the middle of a course of 50 or 60 samples
attributed to the victim; it was allegedly tested approximately
seven days after the last testing of a sample belonging to Kercher.
Anti-contamination procedures were not documented (or dis-
closed); it is unknown if or how surfaces were sterilized; what
protective equipment was used; whether equipment was cleaned
after each run; or how often technicians changed gloves. This was
contrary to the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes
(ENFSI) guidelines on contamination prevention [28] (for example)
which state clearly: “There must be written procedures for
cleaning and decontamination of facilities and equipment.” In
addition, “[r]ecords must be maintained” and “[e]nvironmental
monitoring procedures should be written and records main-
tained.” Even if all protocols had been scrupulously applied – a
conclusion that was not supported by any disclosed document –
there still remained the possibility that cross-transfer of DNA may
have occurred. Speciﬁcally, this may involve transfer from a sample
containing the victim’s DNA to a laboratory surface, and thence to
the knife. This was a possibility even if there are seven or more
intervening days between examinations. Consequently it would
have been prudent to test any evidence in separate laboratory
facilities. At a minimum, samples of a potential murder weapon
should be run prior to any known sample of the victim being
analysed.
Comment: It is necessary to be pro-active to seek evidence that
may “point away” from the defendants. The collection of other
cutlery from the drawer could have been used as controls to
determine the background of DNA proﬁles present on items not
implicated as the crime-weapon.
4.2. Examination for the presence of blood on the knife
Tests on the knife, both on the handle and blade, conducted by
court-appointed independent experts, Carla Vecchiotti and Stefano
Conti, tested negative for blood using the highly-sensitive
Tetramethylbenzidine (TMB) test.
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Before conducting the STR analysis, tests were carried out to
quantify the amount of DNA (if any) in each of the seven samples.
Sample A (taken from the knife handle) reported a concentration
value of DNA of .08 nanograms per microliter; given the quantity of
the sample, this amounted to a total of 4 nanograms of DNA,
sufﬁcient for analysis.
Samples D though G tested negative for DNA and samples B and
C reported values too low to be quantiﬁed accurately. Samples A
and B were subjected to capillary electrophoresis using the
ABIPRISM 3130 Genetic Analyzer instrument and the analysis
software “Gene Mapper.”
The quantity of DNA in sample A fell within the range suggested
by the manufacturer of the kit used for the PCR reaction. With
sample B, insufﬁcient DNA was present to be quantiﬁed. This was
therefore an undisputed low template (LT)-DNA sample, also
veriﬁed by the borderline electropherogram. For purposes of
interpretation, the alleles detected were extremely low level.
4.4. Sample A—the handle
The ampliﬁed DNA product in sample A was then subjected to
capillary electrophoresis. The manual for the Applied Biosystems
AB 3130 instrument used for the analysis recommends an RFU
threshold of 50 and advises that one not go below this point (this
guideline is in common use). The electrophorogram showed peaks
above the reporting threshold (50 RFU) and reasonable allelic
balance. The DNA proﬁle obtained from sample A matched that of
Amanda Knox; to be speciﬁc, the likelihood ratio was calculated
(my calculation using LRmix Studio)6 to be 700 million times more
likely if the DNA was derived from Knox rather than an unknown,
unrelated individual.
4.5. Sample B—the blade
The ampliﬁed DNA product in sample B was also subjected to
capillary gel electrophoresis. The electrophoretic graph showed
peaks that were below the reporting threshold and allele
imbalance at most loci. I counted only 6 alleles that were above
the reporting threshold. The electrophoretic graph showed a
partial DNA proﬁle that was claimed to match Meredith Kercher.
Consequently, sample B was borderline for interpretation. For
LT-DNA analysis, it is preferable to carry out duplicate testing
[29,30] but the sample was not divided in order to carry out this
procedure, hence the results of the analysis were not veriﬁed by re-
ampliﬁcation. Based on my own review of the electrophoretic
graphs, the evidence only weakly supported the Prosecution’s
claim that the partial DNA proﬁle belongs to Kercher.
The Marasca-Bruno Motivations Report, which quashed the
convictions, was particularly critical about the failure to carry out
replicate tests:
“ . . . .one must ask what the relative value can be to the
proceedings if they do not permit repetition, regardless of the
theoretical debate on the identiﬁcation [of] more or less scientiﬁc of
the ﬁndings of investigations carried out on samples so minuscule
or complex.”
The police scientist stated that she ran a negative ampliﬁcation
control concurrently with sample “B” that had very low
background noise7. This ﬁnding was interpreted as evidence that6 Available at: http://lrmixstudio.org/.
7 The court-appointed independent experts were not given the Italian
laboratory’s documents concerning control runs purportedly conducted on the
machine used to test the knife.the item was not contaminated in the Nencini sentencing report
and this was a critical reason why the defendants were found
guilty. The same error was also made in relation to the bra-clasp.
From the Nencini report
“Surely, because it was a low copy number, the sample taken from
the knife’s blade and identiﬁed by letter ‘B’ could not produce
ﬁndings of certain attribution; nevertheless, this Court ﬁnds that
the interpretation of the test is correct for the reasons highlighted
above, because it is a trace that bears the presence of only one
contributor, which make a test error less probable; also, the
positive and negative checks established that there was no
contamination of the item.”
“In conclusion, we must declare that with respect to Item No. 36
(the knife, the alleged murder weapon) and Item No. 165-B (the
closure hook of the bra worn by Meredith KERCHER the night she
was killed), no contamination or pollution has been proven or
could be concretely possible. This assertion is also conﬁrmed by the
negative and positive controls (to be further discussed below)
conducted by Dr. Patrizia Stefanoni and part of the trial record,
which show that there was no contamination of said evidentiary
items.”
However, this was also a serious error of interpretation. The
negative control is simply a blank or empty tube run concurrently
with the samples in the laboratory beginning at the extraction
stage of the analytical process. Consequently, it can only be used as
a control for potential reagent contamination. It cannot be used to
discount possible contamination, either at the crime scene or in the
examination room.
4.6. Subsequent analysis of sample 36(b)
Professors Carla Vecchiotti and Stefano Conti, who were the
appointed independent experts by the Italian appeal court, also
analyzed samples taken from the knife. The knife tested negative
for blood. They also performed cytocentrifugation tests to detect
cellular material, which revealed starch particles on the blade and
handle of the knife, consistent with it being used to prepare food
(starch was found on ﬁve samples, A, F (handle), E (blade), and H, I
(point of contact between handle and knife)). If the knife had been
used in the crime, the starch particles would have been expected to
absorb blood. In addition, if the knife had been subsequently
bleach cleaned, the starch particles would also have been removed
in addition to any blood or DNA i.e. there was no evidence to
suggest that the knife had been treated in this way. The DNA
quantiﬁcation did not reveal DNA suitable for further laboratory
investigation; hence the independent experts did not perform an
STR analysis of their own.
Even if one accepted that sample B contained Kercher’s DNA,
the presence of her DNA was more likely to be the result of a
contamination event.
From the Marasca-Bruno Motivations Report:
“Also erroneous was the reading of the results of the genetic tests
performed on Exhibit 36 and on the presumed compatibility of the
seized weapon with the most serious injuries detected on the
victim's neck. In this regard, it was obviously a distortion by the
judge a quo [of the trial from which this appeal is being heard],
given that no DNA mixture of Kercher and Sollecito was found on
the handle of the knife. On the same utensil, traces of starch were
found, evidence that it could not have been thoroughly washed to
remove incriminating traces. In addition, starch, present in plants,
is well known for its absorbent capacity, therefore it would have
absorbed blood if used to commit the homicide.”
To address the question: “If the DNA on the knife blade was from
Meredith Kercher, how did it get there?” Recall that the Massei
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negative controls. However, it was common ground that Kercher
had never visited Sollecito’s apartment. The Marasca-Bruno
motivation offered an alternative possibility of transfer method,
namely, the utensil could have been used in the Perugia ﬂat:
“taking into account the promiscuity and commonality of
interpersonal relationships, typical of students living away from
home, which make it plausible that a kitchen knife or other utensil
could be moved from one home to another and that, therefore, the
conﬁscated knife could have been moved by Knox to via della
Pergola for domestic use, on the occasion of parties or other events,
and thus also used by Kercher.”
Of course this cannot be proven, but the purpose of the
proposition was to counterbalance the prosecution speculation.
The exercise is useful to demonstrate the imponderability of the
various speculative causes of transfer.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the collection of the item was not carried
out in a formal way, thereby compromising the evidence. Indeed
once evidence is compromised there is nothing that can be done to
retrieve it.
From Marasca-Bruno:
“The big knife or kitchen knife, found in Sollecito’s house and
considered the murder weapon, was collected and then, preserved
in a common cardboard box, of the sort used to package Christmas
gadgets, namely agendas which credit institutions usually gift to
local businesses.”
4.7. The bleach cleaning hypothesis
The negative test results for blood on the knife were key pieces
of evidence. Given the prosecution’s theory that the knife was used
to mortally wound Kercher, the primary question was whether
there was blood on it. The answer to that question was undisputed
at trial: the knife tested negative for blood. Of course, the absence of a
positive test does not prove that blood is not present  but the
alternative explanation is a false negative result, that cannot be
proven. The presence of Kercher’s DNA on the blade of the knife, if
indeed it was there, was not relevant in light of the negative blood
tests because the DNA could equally have been deposited via
“accidental” transfer or some contamination event either before or
after the crime had taken place.
Clearly, if the knife was the murder weapon then it must have
been covered with copious amounts of blood. However, the only
evidence put forward by the prosecution to suggest that the knife
could have been the murder weapon was a rather weak DNA proﬁle
(much of it was below 50rfu) that matched Meredith Kercher on
the blade of the knife, coupled with the DNA proﬁle matching
Amanda Knox on the handle of the knife, suggesting her to be the
perpetrator.
In order to ‘explain away’ the lack of blood (and DNA) on the
knife blade, the prosecution put forward the hypothesis that it had
been cleaned, possibly with bleach. This was based solely on the
premise that there was a ‘strong smell of bleach’ in the kitchen
when Sollecito’s apartment was investigated and the knife looked
shiny, as if it had just been cleaned.
Even if we accepted that the DNA sample does in fact belong to
Kercher, this does not tell us anything about whether the knife was
used in her murder—whether the knife was the murder weapon
was heavily disputed, and even the prosecution’s expertacknowledged the knife was not compatible with all of Kercher’s
wounds8. To reiterate, the DNA proﬁle contained no inherent
information about whether the DNA was associated with Kercher’s
blood or how or when the DNA fragments were transferred. This
weak DNA proﬁle was the type of proﬁle that would be expected if
the DNA fragments had originated from a contamination event. In
addition, the knife tested negative for blood. The expectation is
that any cleaning action powerful enough to remove the blood
proteins would also have removed the DNA, leading to the logical
conclusion that the DNA (if it belonged to Kercher) was more likely
deposited as the result of a contamination event.
However this is another example of cognitive bias—working
backwards from the assumption of guilt and literally pulling
together an account of events that was based upon pure
speculation that was completely devoid of scientiﬁc evidence.
4.8. Propositions relating to the use of the knife to stab the victim vs.
using it to cut food
STR analysis does not offer any information about when or how
the DNA was deposited on the knife. Knox had stated that she had
used the knife to cook in Sollecito’s apartment, and DNA would
naturally be expected to have been deposited because of this
activity. Surprisingly, the Massei report stated that the distribution
of DNA on the knife handle supported the contention that it was
used in an upward stabbing motion by Amanda Knox, rather than a
cutting motion (e.g., to cut bread).
From the Massei motivation:
“It must be also emphasised that the presence of biological traces
discovered on the handle of this knife, – and on which, regarding its
attribution to Amanda, there was advanced no particular censure
nor perplexity, – appears more likely to have been derived from her
having held the knife to strike, rather than from having used it to
cut some food.”
And the justiﬁcation for the conclusion follows:
“Remembering that this trace was found at the point in which the
knife handle has a kind of upturn or rise, after which the blade
begins, with the knife positioned thus in a horizontal position with
respect to the plane on which one is cutting], it appears somewhat
unlikely to hypothesise that such a biological trace would have
come to rest at the point indicated. Conversely, should the cutting
implement be used for striking, and therefore moving it not
horizontally, but with a certain inclination, it is quite probable for
the hand holding the knife to undergo a sliding motion due to the
violence required for the blow and, ﬁnishing up with a certain
violence against said upturn, thereby leaving behind the biological
trace.”
However, it is clear that this conclusion in the Massei motivation
was pure speculation without any grounding in scientiﬁc analysis.
There is not a single reported publication in the world that would
support the notion that DNA analysis could reveal how a knife was
used. DNA analysis, without additional supporting evidence, can
only inform about the potential identity of the originator, i.e. who,
but not when,where, how, or why transfer occurred [2].
4.9. Summary
To summarise, the assumption that the DNA had originated
from blood was contrary to the scientiﬁc evidence. There was no8 Professor Bacci testiﬁed for the prosecution that the knife was compatible with
the largest neck wound, and that a smaller knife made the other wounds. The
defense experts testiﬁed that the knife was not compatible with the neck wound or
any other wound.
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no scientiﬁc evidence that the blood-proteins could have been
selectively removed with bleach while leaving the DNA on the
blade. Bleach destroys DNA, and is used in laboratories for precisely
that purpose. If bleach had been used to clean all of the blood from
the knife, it is highly probable that it would have also destroyed any
DNA on the knife. There is no accepted method that can be used to
indicate whether the distribution of DNA on the knife indicated its
use to stab the victim vs. to cut food.
5. The bra clasp
The identiﬁcation of a DNA proﬁle that matched Sollecito was a
critical piece of evidence as it was the only DNA evidence found in
the murder room that could be used by the prosecution to
associate Sollecito with the crime.
5.1. Collection of the clasp
Police ofﬁcers collected the clasp from Kercher’s room on
December 18, 2007–forty-six days after Kercher’s body was
discovered. During this period, the clasp was shifted to different
locations around the room. Video evidence demonstrated that the
ofﬁcers did not follow proper procedures with respect to the
handling of this item, e.g., they used non-sterile gloves, did not
change gloves after touching a surface or item, passed the clasp
around, and dropped it on the ﬂoor. The failure to adopt these
measures was signiﬁcant because Sollecito had frequented the
apartment and had attempted to open the door to Kercher’s
bedroom prior to the discovery of her body on November 2nd,
2007. This could have been a source of contamination. There was
no attempt made to take samples from the outer door handle.
Gloves have been shown to be excellent intermediary substrates to
transfer low levels of DNA from one object to another [31,32].
From the Marasca-Bruno motivation:
“Moreover, the clasp, although noted during the ﬁrst site inspection
by the Scientiﬁc Police, was left on the ﬂoor and remained there for
quite some time. It is not true, moreover, that between the initial
access and that during which the clasp was at last acquired, that
there were only two site searches by the investigators, which were
more numerous in reality and on those occasions everything was
turned upside-down. In this regard, no account was taken of the
defence’s observations and of the conclusions to the contrary
reached by the party's consultant, Professor Tagliabracci.”
The method of collecting, handling, transporting, and analyzing
the bra clasp did not conform with basic protocols to minimize
risks of cross-contamination. There were numerous opportunities
in this process for cross-transfer and contamination of the clasp.
From the Marasca-Bruno motivation:
“Regarding the possible contamination of the sample, the appellate
judges ignored the photographic materials included in the court
records, which clearly demonstrated possible contamination in the
way the clasp was treated, being passed from hand to hand by
persons wearing dirty latex gloves.”
Comment: The examination of the bra-clasp at the crime scene
was video recorded (this found its way onto social media).
5.2. Initial testing of the clasp
The clasp was not tested for the presence of blood, neither was
any other laboratory test carried out to show the presence of any
other biological material. However, it was subjected to DNA
analysis. As with the knife, tests were carried out in order to
quantify the amount of DNA. Quantiﬁcation revealed an averageconcentration of 0.115 nanograms per microliter, for a total
quantity of extract of 5.775 nanograms, an amount permitting
PCR ampliﬁcation and STR analysis. Note that the majority of the
DNA was from the victim.
The extracted DNA was ampliﬁed through the PCR process and
then subjected to capillary electrophoresis. The electropherogram
revealed a mixed sample—i.e., more than two alleles were visible at
several loci. The results were interpreted and it was concluded that
the sample was compatible with the hypothesis that the sample
contained a mixture of Kercher’s and Sollecito’s DNA. Whereas it
was possible to agree that the tests detected DNA matching the
reference proﬁle of Sollecito’s on the bra clasp, it does not follow
that this tells us anything about his presence at the crime scene. In
light of the 46-day delay in collecting the clasp, the presence of
proﬁles of other individuals in the sample (as discussed in the next
section), and the failure to follow basic standard protocols for the
collection and storage of the clasp, the evidence was irreversibly
compromised. Consequently, the most likely explanation for the
presence of Sollecito’s DNA is that it resulted from a contamination
event, although the speciﬁc route cannot be discovered.
Comment: The bra-clasp was crucial evidence for the prosecu-
tion case since it was the only DNA evidence to link Sollecito in the
room of Kercher.
5.3. Subsequent testing of the clasp
Professors Vecchiotti and Conti also considered the clasp for
further DNA testing. This was not possible to retest because it was
rusted over. The electropherograms were re-interpreted.
The major proﬁle was from the victim. Professors Vecchiotti and
Conti pointed out the presence of one or more (unknown) minor
contributors that were also present on the clasp, in addition to the
component that matched Sollecito’s reference DNA sample. There
was a logical inconsistency in the prosecution case where it was
assumed that the “known” individual is the culprit, whereas the
“unknown” individual(s) were assumed to be irrelevant.
The Marasca-Bruno motivation was particularly scathing:
“[The appeal] particularly denounces the anomalies in the
collection of the knife (Exhibit 36) and of the clasp of the victim’s
bra, anomalies of such relevance that the risk of contamination
cannot be excluded, as correctly assessed by the Conti-Vecchiotti
expert report, ordered by the Perugian Court of Assizes, that also
considered the scientiﬁc result to be unreliable, precisely because it
could not be tested again.”
“The clasp was perhaps trodden on or, in any case, moved (such
that it was found on the ﬂoor in a different position from where it
had initially been noticed). Not only this, but the photographic
documentation produced by Sollecito’s defence demonstrates that,
at the time of the collection, the clasp was passed from hand to
hand by the agents, who in addition were wearing dirty latex
gloves.”
6. Other DNA evidence and the selective cleaning hypothesis
6.1. Kercher’s Room
Numerous DNA samples were drawn from Kercher’s room and
her clothes, and Knox’s DNA was not found on any of them. It was
suggested that this absence may be explained by the fact that Knox
selectively cleaned Kercher’s room to remove her DNA while
leaving behind the DNA of convicted-assailant Guede. Once again,
this is evidence that the prosecutors ‘ﬁtted’ an explanation to an
inconvenient result.
There was no scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for this selective-cleaning
theory. DNA is invisible to the naked eye, and DNA can be
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DNA is transferred to an object, it may transfer to other locations on
that object or to an entirely different object. The only way to ensure
that one has not left DNA behind in a room is to clean it with sterile
implements while wearing protective gear. It is not possible to
clean a room to selectively remove all traces of one individual’s
DNA whilst leaving behind another individual’s DNA. Moreover, in
a murder in which three people allegedly participated in killing a
victim who was ﬁghting back, each of the perpetrators’ DNA could
be anywhere in the room. Saliva, which is rich in DNA, for example,
could be sprayed on different surfaces. It would not be possible for
one of the perpetrators to even know where his DNA as opposed to
the DNA of others was deposited. The perpetrators’ DNA could also
be mixed together and it would not be possible to somehow
separate the DNA using household cleaning supplies.
The Marasca-Bruno motivation recognized the ﬂawed argu-
ment:
“The hypothesis of an alleged selective cleaning of the crime scene
by the defendant was completely illogical, with it being basically
impossible to remove some genetic traces while leaving others
untouched.”
6.2. The shared bathroom
To reinforce the illogicality of the selective cleaning hypothesis,
during the investigation, ofﬁcers collected hundreds of DNA
samples throughout the apartment and found Knox’s and Kercher’s
DNA mixed in ﬁve of them. None of the samples were found in
Kercher’s room, and three were found in the bathroom that Knox
and Kercher shared. These three samples were taken from areas of
the bathroom with bloodstains.
This had been previously interpreted by the Massei motivation
as follows:
“Amanda, soiled with Meredith’s blood, entered the bathroom
which was right next door to the room in which Meredith had been
stabbed; putting her hand against the door she left a mark on it and
the dribble of blood which remained is a sign [proof] of this, and left
a mark also – still with Meredith’s blood – on the light switch; she
touched the cotton-bud box which was on the sink and left a mixed
trace specimen of herself and of Meredith . . . ”
Mixtures of Knox and Kercher were found in the washbasin and
bidet and Massei inferred:
“an activity that, through the action of rubbing, involved the
cleaning of the victim’s blood, and could involve the loss of the
cells through exfoliation of whoever was cleaning themselves:
the two biological traces thus united together in that single
trace.”
These statements relate to the activity of transfer—not backed-
up by any scientiﬁc evidence beyond the sub-source inference.
There is an expectation that mixtures of DNA will be observed as
natural background where people share premises. This expectation
of mixtures also extends to visitors of premises. Therefore the
limitations of interpretation of the DNA evidence are still ﬁrmly
rooted at sub-source level.
As previously explained, there is a signiﬁcant level of
background DNA in any given environment. Premises will
therefore contain considerable amounts of DNA from the
individuals that inhabit them. DNA will be transmitted to surfaces
and items by mechanisms such as touching, shedding skin cells,
and saliva spray. Consequently, it is expected a priori that DNA of
Knox and Kercher will be discovered in a shared bathroom. In
addition it would be expected to ﬁnd mixtures of their DNA 
noting that DNA can be deposited at different times and by
different body ﬂuids, or by touch. There is nothing inherent in amixed DNA sample that indicates that the DNA fragments were
deposited at the same time; the transfer of the DNA from the
individual contributors can arise from independent events.
Massei went much further to infer a reason why Sollecito’s DNA
was not found in the bathroom, clearly starting from the premise of
guilt, and working backwards:
“Raffaele Sollecito could have washed himself in the shower stall, in
a different way and with an abundance of water, so that, either for
one reason (no rubbing action, or not effected in the same way), or
for another reason (use of water in large quantities), he did not
leave his own biological traces while he was washing himself, or
rather, he could have washed himself before Amanda, so that the
water used by her immediately afterwards could have carried
away the preceding possible traces.”
This is another example of speculation leading to illogical
deduction. Here we also see that hypotheses are continually put
forward that cannot be tested scientiﬁcally.
The Marasca-Bruno motivation discredited the Massei motiva-
tion and postulated that the contact with the victim’s blood was
post-crime, again citing the lack of evidence in the murder room
and elsewhere (although personally I think it more probable that
Knox’s DNA was present in the bathroom before the crime-event
and the blood was transferred by Guede as he washed himself
afterwards). Ultimately, this remains an example of speculative
imponderability since there is no means to test the various
explanations of the evidence (or lack of it).
From Marasca-Bruno:
“no trace leading to her was found at the scene of the crime or on
the victim’s body, so that – if all the above is accepted – her contact
with the victim’s blood would have occurred after the crime and in
another part of the house.”
The reasoning further cited the fatally ﬂawed explanation of the
selective cleaning hypothesis to remove the genetic evidence of
Sollecito and Knox from the crime-scene room:
“After all, the assertion itself of a presumed carefulness in the
cleaning is factually proven wrong, since in the “small bathroom”
traces of blood have been found on the mat, on the bidet, on the tap,
on a Q-tips box and on the light switch. And yet, had the defendants
been guilty, they surely would not have lacked the time for an
accurate cleaning, in the sense that there was no reason for the
perpetrators to hurry up for fear of the possible arrival at home of
other people. In fact, Knox was perfectly aware that Romanelli and
Mezzetti were outside Perugia and would not have come back
home that night, hence there would have been all the time
necessary for a careful cleaning of the house.”
7. Footprints in blood?
A number of footprints identiﬁed with luminol were discovered
in the hallway, some of which (items 177 and 183) revealed a
mixture of Knox and Kercher. Item 183 was reported as:
“compatible with the hypothesis of a mixture of biological
substances, presumably containing hematic substances, belonging
to Amanda Marie Knox and Meredith Susanna Cara Kercher.”
Item 177 was similarly reported as:
“compatible with the hypothesis of an admixture of biological
substances presumably containing hematic matter and belonging
to Amanda Marie Knox and Meredith Susanna Cara Kercher.”
However, the more speciﬁc TMB test was negative. The defence
team argued that there was no proof that the footprints were blood
as the tests were not conﬁrmatory and there were known reagents
that cause false positive results (like cleaning reagents). Therefore,
it was not surprising that mixtures of Knox/Kercher were found in
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judgement as proof that the origins of the footprints were directly
related in a temporal sense to the crime event (the same error as
described in the previous section in relation to the blood spots in
the bathroom).
The Marasca-Bruno motivation dismissed this conclusion as “an
obvious misrepresentation of the evidence”, citing the negative TMB
test as a reason why the traces could not be deﬁnitively described
as blood. In the Nencini report, the judges ‘overcame’ the
difﬁculties of the non-speciﬁc luminol test by arguing (illogically)
that its veracity had to be considered in context of the murder-
scene, which made it more likely that the luminol test was
associated with blood rather than being a false positive result.
Furthermore they argued that the low levels of blood found were
further evidence of the selective cleaning hypothesis.
Marasca-Bruno dismissed the argument: “The weakness of the
argument is such, already at ﬁrst sight, that it does not require any
confutation”
Comment: To reiterate the point once again, if blood from
Kercher was present in the area of the footprint, it does not mean
that the DNA proﬁle attributed to Knox was deposited at the same
time. A priori we expect to ﬁnd DNA mixtures of the inhabitants of a
ﬂat where the individuals live in close proximity. DNA mixtures
may be found outside the area of the footprint. Distributions of
DNA proﬁles will be present as part of the ‘natural background’ of
the apartment.
8. DNA evidence relating to Rudy Guede compared to the
absence of evidence from Sollecito and Knox
Rudy Guede was convicted of the offence of the murder of
Meredith Kercher and this conviction has not been disputed. He
had not previously visited Kercher’s apartment prior to the crime.
Therefore the presence of his DNA was not explained by any
legitimate reason for him to have been present at the crime scene.
However, multiple DNA proﬁles attributed to Guede were in fact
recovered, including: inside Ms. Kercher’s body, on her sweatshirt,
on her bra, and on her purse, and in a toilet bowl in one of the
bathrooms.
The numerous DNA samples taken from the crime scene
attributed to Guede are consistent with the distribution of proﬁles
expected from the perpetrator of a violent crime. In contrast, the
DNA samples recovered from the knife blade and the bra clasp
were the type of observations to be expected if the transfer had
resulted from a contamination event. The strength of the evidence
against Guede stood in stark contrast with the evidence against
Knox and Sollecito.
To summarise the main points:
 Guede had no legitimate reason to be in the apartment.
 His DNA was found in multiple locations in the murder room and
in thebathroom.
 Even though Knox lived in the apartment, her DNA was not found
in the murder room.
 The only DNA attributed to Sollecito was a minor proﬁle found on
the bra-clasp.
The key consideration was the distribution of DNA proﬁles of
Guede vs Knox and Sollecito. Multiple proﬁles from multiple
evidential items are much less likely to all be contamination
incidents, whereas weak (one-off) results are more likely to be
contaminants—this was always a recognized difﬁculty for the
prosecution who invented the selective cleaning hypothesis to
explain away inconvenient results.
From the Marasca-Bruno motivation:“It is indisputably impossible that traces attributable to the
appellants would not have been found at the crime scene had they
taken part in Kercher’s murder (the room was of small dimensions:
2.91 3.36 m, as shown in the plan reproduced in f: 76).
No trace belonging to them was found in particular on the sweater
that the victim was wearing at the time she was attacked nor on
her shirt underneath, which would have been the case if they had
participated in the murder (instead, traces of Guede were found on
a sleeve of the aforementioned sweater: ff, 179–180).
This aforementioned negative circumstance accords with the fact,
already highlighted, of the absolute impracticability of the
posthumous clean-up hypothesis, removing some biological traces
while leaving others.”
9. The advice from the Marasca-Bruno motivation on the
analysis of evidence
9.1. Objectivity vs. subjectivity
The advice from the Marasca-Bruno motivation follows:
“The rigorous respect of such methodical norms offers a
conventional coefﬁcient of acceptable credibility of such results,
primarily linked to their reproducibility—namely the possibility of
obtaining these results, and only these, reproduced with a
constantly identical method and under identical conditions,
according to fundamental empirical rules. On a more general
level following the scientiﬁc method starting with Galileo Galilei on
the application of the “scientiﬁc method”. This is typically leading
to “objective” reality, reliable, veriﬁable and agreeable  well-
known to be consistent, on one hand, in the collection of empirical
data agreeable with the hypothesis and the theory to be validated;
on the other hand in the mathematical and rigorous analysis,
associating in this way – as ﬁrst afﬁrmed by the above-mentioned
Galilei – “sensible experiences” to “necessary demonstrations”,
that constitute experimental mathematics. As will be seen, all of
this is essentially missing from the present trial.”
Here there is a plea for scientists to strictly follow the ‘scientiﬁc
method’ that began with Galileo Galilei and formalised by Sir Isaac
Newton. The standards of proof required in forensic science should
be no different from any other science and practitioners must
adhere to recognised scientiﬁc principles of objectivity where
decisions are based upon a ‘collection of empirical data agreeable
with the hypothesis to be validated’; ‘sensible experiences’ implies
that an element of subjective opinion is acceptable to formulate
plausible propositions, but must be tested by ‘necessary demon-
strations’.
For a given set of data and case circumstances, the same
conclusions are arrived at independently by different scientists
using ‘objective inference’. Subjectivists emphasise ‘personal
belief’ based on a knowledge base that may include vague notions
such as ‘personal experience’. Whereas objectivism strives towards
a commonality of approach so that different scientists reach
broadly the same conclusions (a consensus).
There is little doubt that courts require an objective analysis and
the role of the expert is therefore to reﬂect the consensus view of
scientists, rather than to provide a purely personal viewpoint
which is subjective so that a consensus viewpoint may be difﬁcult
to demonstrate.
Further discussion is needed within the forensic community. It
is probably best to think of the terms objective vs subjective as
representing two opposite extremes. It is unrealistic to suppose
that a scientiﬁc rendition can be purely objective, as there is always
an element of subjectivity. Deciding plausible propositions is often
difﬁcult—and perhaps this is where the main element of
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demonstrations’ implies that the onus is for scientists and
investigators to think much more carefully about casework
practices in order to provide empirical proof for any particular
hypothesis that is put forward. The crime-scene has to be treated
more as a ‘research-project’ with appropriate sampling, along with
careful consideration about necessary controls in order to provide
a sound basis for inferences to be put forward. The responsibility of
the court is to provide a forum where critical peer review can take
place, without bias.
9.2. The role of the judge and the burden of proof
The Marasca-Bruno motivation reminds us that judges typically
have no scientiﬁc training and therefore cannot arbitrate as an
‘expert of experts’:
“[This idea] is in fact decidedly anachronistic, at least to the extent
that it expects to assign to the judge a real ability to master the ﬂow
of scientiﬁc knowledge that the parties pour into the proceeding; a
more realistic formulation, by contrast, sees the judge as wholly
oblivious to those contributions, which are the fruit of a scientiﬁc
training that he or she does not, need not, and cannot possess.”
Within the constraints of the court-room, judges may
themselves fall into the trap of thinking that they understand
scientiﬁc arguments but this can itself lead to perverse judge-
ments. For example, in relation to the question of whether
contamination had/had not occurred, the judge in the Nencini
motivation made the critical error of believing that the observation
of clean negative controls was evidence that it had not occurred.
This led to the ‘reverse burden of proof’ where the defence team
had to prove that contamination had occurred, overturning the
previous Helmann motivation who had correctly ruled the
converse: responsibility rests with the prosecution to prove that
contamination had not occurred. In practice, objective proof cannot
be achieved either way, but this case was an example where
sufﬁcient doubt had been raised to elevate the possibility of
contamination as a plausible explanation of the evidence. The
Marasca-Bruno motivation provides the following guidance for
judges, urging the adoption of an objective frame of reference that
relies solely on evidence, putting aside personal ‘feelings’ about the
guilt/innocence that inevitably invite cognitive errors found in the
Nencini and Massei motivations. Above all, the judge must remain
purely objective. If a hypothesis cannot be properly tested then he/
she must acquit—perhaps the most important advice to be read
from the Marasca-Bruno motivation is:
“In other words, the use of logic and intuition cannot, in any way,
compensate for the lack of evidence or the inefﬁciency of the
investigations. Faced with missing, insufﬁcient or contradictory
evidence, the judge should simply accept it and issue a verdict of
acquittal, according to Article 530, section 2 of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, even if he is really convinced of the guilt of the
defendant.”
10. Summary of the critical errors that ultimately led to the
wrongful convictions of Knox and Sollecito
1) Failure to utilize methods/procedures designed to mimimise
risks of contamination, thereby irreversibly compromising the
probative value of the evidence.
2) Inferring ‘activity’ directly from DNA proﬁles found on the
evidence (the CSI effect). For example the proposition that the
DNA proﬁle from Knox found on the handle of the knife
conﬁrmed the activity of stabbing rather than the activity of
cutting food.3) The assumption that DNA mixtures of Knox/Kercher identiﬁed
as ‘bloody footprints’ using luminol was conﬁrmatory evidence.
4) Applying illogical hypotheses in order to ‘explain away’ ﬁndings
that were inconvenient to the prosecution including: a) the
selective cleaning hypothesis b) the bleach cleaning hypothesis.
5) Lack of repeatability of the key DNA ﬁndings (the DNA
attributed to bra-clasp and the DNA attributed to Kercher on
the knife).
6) The mistaken belief by the trial judges that negative controls
somehow provided a guarantee that contamination had not
occurred and the application of the reverse burden of proof.
7) The assumption that the DNA mixtures of Knox/Kercher in the
bathroom, was evidence that she had washed blood from her
hands directly after the murder.
8) Finally, the distributions of DNA proﬁles were a critical feature.
Contrast the widespread presence of Rudy Guede’s DNA in the
murder room, bearing in mind he had no legitimate access to
the premises. In stark contrast, the DNA of both Knox and
Sollecito was absent from the murder room (apart from the
discredited bra-clasp DNA proﬁle that matched Sollecito). This
contrast is even more poignant given that Knox lived in the
apartment with Kercher, and Sollecito had legitimate access.
There is an a priori expectation that their DNA should be present
at the crime scene.
11. Post-script: how many different ‘miscarriages of justice’
occurred in this case and how/why did they occur?
This question was motivated by an anonymous referee to this
paper who asks “How many miscarriages of justice were there” and
“could they have been averted?”
This case was unusual in that there was extraordinary
worldwide publicity and scrutiny and it has been suggested that
the prosecution machine was under pressure to produce results,
and this in part led to the development of implausible propositions.
A miscarriage of justice relates solely to the event of the
wrongful conviction an individual (there were two individuals
hence the plural is used). However, the causes are typically
propagated by multiple errors that are committed by all of the
actors participating in the criminal justice system [2] —police,
scientists, lawyers, judges. Examples of each are provided below:
(1) The Bleach cleaning hypothesis was propagated by the police—
see news report: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/1569485/Meredith-suspects-DNA-found-on-knife.html.
Then the prosecution presented that theory at trial, eliciting
testimony from one of the police ofﬁcers that he sensed a
strong smell of bleach while he was collecting evidence at
Sollecito’s apartment and that the knife looked very clean. As
far as we can tell, there was no evidence presented from the
scientiﬁc experts on this topic.
(2) Testimony from scientiﬁc experts was misleading in at least
one way. For example, the luminol evidence was reported as
“presumably containing hematic substances,” despite the fact
that conﬁrmatory tests for blood came back negative. It was
also testiﬁed that there was no reason to think the bra clasp had
been compromised when it was dropped to the ﬂoor during the
police investigation. In addition, the Conti-Vecchiotti report
described the lab report as lacking in important details and
containing arbitrary theories that could not be scientiﬁcally
determined.
(3) It’s hard to say how the judges on each panel dealt with and
deliberated on the case—that sort of information has not been
reported, as far as we know. However, it is safe to say that there
is ample evidence that judges underappreciated the defense’s
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prosecution’s theory that Knox and Sollecito selectively
cleaned the apartment of their DNA after Meredith was
murdered.
(4) Could this injustice have been averted? Bad practices in
evidence collection and examination certainly played a major
role. If the crime scene, or collected items are compromised,
nothing can be done to retrieve the situation. There is only one
chance to do things properly—we cannot go back in time. DNA
evidence is given great weight at trial and the evidence can so
easily be compromised.
(5) However, the greatest responsibility to averting miscarriages of
justice must reside with the judge, who is the ‘gatekeeper’, he
must be completely impartial, and should at once recognize
logical ﬂaws in arguments, always erring on the side of caution.
I therefore ﬁnish by repeating the poignant comment from the
Marasca-Bruno motivation who issued the following guidance
(section 9.2 above): “Faced with missing, insufﬁcient or
contradictory evidence, the judge should simply accept it and
issue a verdict of acquittal . . . . . . even if he is really convinced of
the guilt of the defendant.”
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